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The EU protects some of its fruits and vegetables through the entry price system. This 
system consists on a two-tiered tariff, with high-priced exports paying an ad valorem 
tariff, whereas low-priced exports pay also a supplementary specific tariff. The breaking 
point between high and low export prices is the entry price level decided by the EU, 
generally the same level for all third countries. In a few cases, some Southern 
Mediterranean partners of the EU have agreed a reduced entry price for their exports, 
together with the more common ad valorem tariff reduction. Among the indicators used 
for gauge the value of preferences, there is no one devoted to this case of reduced entry 
price, hence we develop a new indicator that allows to split which part of the 
preferential gains corresponds to the entry price reduction and which part corresponds to 
the “usual” ad valorem tariff reduction. We apply this methodology to Moroccan 
clementines trade flows, with two main findings: 1) The entry price reduction ranges up 
to 39% of the economic value of preferences in some months; 2) Morocco is not 
maximizing the gains due to this reduction, and could take some trade and policy 
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lessons, mainly trying to better fit to the concession or, if impossible, use it as 
negotiating capital in future reviews of the agreement. 
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ASSESSING EURO-MED TRADE PREFERENCES: THE CASE OF ENTRY PRICE 
REDUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The EU protects some of its fruits and vegetables through the entry price system. This 
system is implemented for “sensitive” products which often are important for the 
exports of Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMC) such as tomatoes, cucumbers, 
artichokes, courgettes, peaches and citrus fruits. In many cases, the system applies on a 
seasonal basis, remaining the protection for a part of the year through the “usual” tariff 
system. In some cases, SMC have agreed a reduction of the entry price applied for their 
exports to the EU. In this paper, we show a new indicator to gauge the gains accrued to 
the SMC in these cases and apply it to the case of Moroccan clementines.  
 
2. The entry price system and trade preferences 
 
The entry price mechanism and its differences with its predecessor have been widely 
discussed by Swinbank and Ritson (1995) and Tangermann (1996). The system consists 
on a two-tiered tariff. When the border price of exports to the EU is above the entry 
price, they must pay an ad valorem tariff, whereas exports priced below the entry price 
level must pay a supplementary specific tariff after being burdened by the ad valorem 
tariff. The amount of the specific tariff depends on the relationship between the entry 
price level and the border price for the shipment: the cheaper is the product, the higher 
is the specific tariff applied, being the aim to prevent the entry of cheap products that 
erode the market competitiveness of EU productions. Thus, when the rate [border price 
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to entry price] ranges between 92% and 100%, the exporter pays the difference between 
them (rounded in 2% steps). If the rate is lesser than 92%, it must be paid the maximum 
tariff equivalent (MTE) according to WTO commitments.  
 
The entry price level for each product and period is decided by the EU, to ease the 
implementation of the system, the European Commission calculates and publishes the 
Standard Import Value (SIV) for each day and destination, as a proxy of the border 
price of imports coming from every destination.  
 
Cioffi and dell’Aquilla (no date) analyse the effects of the system on exports of apples, 
tomatoes and oranges from different countries to the EU and state that: 1) The MTE acts 
virtually as a prohibitive tariff; 2) There is relatively low frequency of SIV undercutting 
the entry price in oranges and apples, whereas for tomatoes it is more likely this 
situation to happen; 3) They report a certain reduction of exports to the EU after the 
system was implemented; 4) The entry prices and MTE cause a twofold segmentation of 
the EU internal market of fruits and vegetables. There is a market for lower quality 
products where EU supply is completely insulated from external competition. On the 
other side there is a market for high quality products where the EU production competes 
with the production of third countries with the sole protection of the ad valorem tariff. 
 
Other consequence of the system that they mention could be that it stimulates non-
competitive behaviour among traders and introduces incentives to collusive 
arrangements in order to get the main part of the preferences rent. In this field, 
Chemnitz and Grethe (2005) discuss the organization of the Moroccan tomato exporter 
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sector, stating that there is a relatively high degree of collusion to appropriate the “entry 
price quota rent”.  
 
This rent exists because for several cases, SMC have agreed in their Association 
Agreements -or their reviews- a reduction of the MFN entry price level. This agreed 
entry price is country and product specific and represents a trade advantage for 
preference receiving countries, additional to the tariff reductions and exemptions that 
represent the majority of the preferences that the EU grants to SMC. 
 
With regards to future changes in the system after Doha Round agreement, Antón and 
Atance (2007) develop a methodology to quantify the effect on market access of tariff 
cuts under EU entry price regime under different alternatives. They find that WTO 
proposal from the EU for sensitive products is not guaranteeing smaller market 
expansion than the proposal for the normal (non-sensitive) products.  
 
Nowadays, Jordan and Morocco have agreed entry price reduction for tomatoes, 
cucumbers, courgettes, artichokes, oranges and clementines, and both Egypt and Israel 
have been granted a reduction for their exports of oranges. It is worthwhile to mention 
that, in the most of these cases, the entry price reduction applies only for a given 
quantity, and that the preferential entry price is accompanied by a reduction (often 
elimination) of the ad valorem part of the tariff. As the entry price defines the specific 
part of the tariff, both specific and ad valorem tariffs are therefore reduced under these 
preferential schemes. 
 
3. The value of preferences 
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The next graph depicts the different border treatments that Moroccan and Jordan 
tomatoes enjoy compared to MFN tomatoes in a given date and period, according to the 
reduced entry price.  
 
Graph 1: MFN vs. preferential entry price for tomatoes. Jan-March, campaign 05/06 
 
 Source: own calculations based on TARIC database 
 
It can be seen that preferential exporters can take advantage of the reduction of entry 
price through two alternatives (or a combination of them) (Grethe and Tangermann, 
1998): a product with the same border price as a MFN product can be sold at EU 
markets cheaper than its competitors, increasing market share, or, alternatively, a 
product sold in destination markets at the same price as a MFN represents higher price 
perceived by preferential exporters. Hence, eventually there is an economic transfer to 
the preference-receiver countries. 
 
Among the three alternative strands existing to assess the impact of preferences (Grethe, 
2005), one corresponds to the indicators based on actual trade flows –being the other 
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two the ex post econometric analysis and the ex ante simulation models. These 
indicators give an assessment about the actual coverage and the utility of a preferential 
scheme, the deepness of the tariff cut and the value of the preferences compared to the 
MFN conditions, by using actual trade flows. By construction, they are intuitive and 
relatively easy to calculate, being their main shortcoming their static nature since they 
use data on trade happening under given circumstances.  
 
One of these indicators is the Value of the Preference Margin (VPM). By definition, it is 
the difference in perceived prices between preferential and non-preferential exporters 
times the quantity that is exported under these conditions. 
 
pWp qPPVPM )( −=  (1) 
 
where, “PP” is the price perceived by preferential exporters, “PW” is the world price for 
the product - assuming that MFN exporters perceive it- and “qP” is the quantity exported 
by the preferential country. 
 
Grethe and Tangermann (1998) indicate that both preferential and non-preferential 
MFN products are sold in the destination market (EU) at the same price “PEU”: 
 
)1()1( pPMFNWEU tPtPP +=+=  (2) 
 
where “t” are the ad valorem tariffs (both for MFN and preferential countries). 
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It can be easily shown that the combination of (1) and (2) yields the expression for 
calculating VPM. 
 
PP
MFN
PMFN qP
t
tt
VPM +
−=
1
)(
 (3) 
 
This VPM is the calculation in monetary terms of the potential value of benefits to a 
preference-receiving country for a particular product (Yamazaki, 1996). As Grethe 
(2005) states, it corresponds to the tariff revenue forgone by the donor country. 3 The 
indicator can be used to illustrate the potential losses resulting of preferences erosion, as 
Yamazaki (1996) and Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) make.  
 
It is noteworthy to mention the “potential” or “maximum” characteristic of the transfer 
calculated with this indicator. It is firstly assumed that all rents from preferential access 
accrue to the exporter country. Grethe et al. (2005) elaborate on this issue, being the 
main reason why the rent might not accrue to exporters a result of the way EU market 
regimes are administered. In the case of a binding TRQ, where no minimum import 
price system is in operation, the result strongly depends on the method chosen for 
allocating licenses for trade under the TRQ. This is because the "owner" of the license is 
likely to attract (most of) the preference margin as he is in a quasi-monopolist position. 
Second, the indicator is an overestimate of the rent when the MFN conditions are 
prohibitive and therefore no trade is happening under MFN conditions. Also, a third 
assumption underlying is the full utilization of the preferential scheme. 
                                                 
3 There are other formulations for calculating the VPM. Tangermann (2002) adapts (2) and (3) for the 
case of specific tariffs, whereas Yamazaki (1996) and Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) calculate VPM 
using world prices PW instead of PP.  
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To date, there are few efforts to calculate the VPM in the case of entry price reduction. 
Martínez and García (2004) adopted an ad hoc formulation with this purpose. Their 
formulation only holds in certain particular cases where export price equals exactly 
entry price; otherwise, it is an approximation. In general terms, if it is available the ad 
valorem tariff equivalent (AVE) of the whole measure, it is possible to calculate the 
potential transfer using the usual expression (3). It seems to be the case in Grethe and 
Tangermann (1998).  
 
But adopting this approach makes impossible to fully disentangle which part of the 
transfer corresponds to the entry price reduction and which part corresponds to the ad 
valorem part of the tariff reduction. In a first sight, as the EU seems reluctant to reduce 
entry prices for its SMC partners while the ad valorem tariff reduction is the only 
concession in most of the products affected by the entry price scheme, one tends to 
presume that the entry price reduction is of utmost relevance in economic terms. 
 
To check this a priori guess, a variation of (3) has been performed. First, it is assumed 
that the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of the entry price measure is split up into the 
specific part plus the pure ad valorem part, both for preferential and non-preferential 
exporters: 
 
W
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p
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P
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Where “t” correspond to the AVE of the measure as a whole, “d” are the ad valorem 
tariffs of the corresponding part of the measure, and “s” are the specific tariffs to be 
levied.  
 
Then, departing from the ideas articulated in (1) and (2), it is easily got the expression 
of the value of the preference margin when exists entry price reduction (VPMEP): 
 
pppMFN
MFN
p
ppMFNEP Pqddt
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qssVPM 


 −+
++−=
1
1
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This expression of the VPMEP has two addends. The first addend assesses the gain due 
to the specific tariff cut, which in turn is caused by the entry price reduction as seen in 
section 2. The second addend of the expression corresponds to the gain due to the cut of 
the ad valorem part of the tariff. For ease in the exposition of the subsequent results, it 
is “labelled” every addend with a different denomination. The first addend is called 
“specific gain” and the second is the “ad valorem gain”.  
 
Clearly, when there is no entry price reduction, there is no specific tariff cut and 
therefore the first addend is zero, being the VPMEP identical to VPM as it appears in (3). 
It could be understood as if “d” tariffs are equivalent to “t” tariffs, neglecting the effect 
of specific tariffs since they are levied similarly to all the exporters. 
 
In a given period, the total VPMEP that a preferential SMC can obtain depends mostly 
on the specific gain, since the ad valorem tariff cut is fixed for every country (and 
shipment, therefore). In turn, the specific gain varies for every shipment since the border 
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price determines the specific tariff to be paid. Moreover, the level of the border price 
compared with the agreed entry price and the MFN entry price is crucial to determine if 
the country is maximizing the specific gain. 
 
This gain would be maximized in the case where the shipment is prized so as it would 
not pay any specific tariff as preferential and it would pay all the MTE as a non-
preferential treatment. The worst case would be if the shipment is so cheap that it would 
pay the MTE both as preferential and as non-preferential treatment: there would not be 
any specific gain. The same if it was so expensive that would not pay specific tariff in 
any case. There are a number of intermediate situations, where the specific gain would 
exist, but not reaching its maximum amount. Graph 2 depicts all the cases.4 
 
Graph 2. Specific MFN tariff – specific preferential tariff, depending on shipment price 
 
 
4. Empirical application 
 
                                                 
4 The graph has been made under the assumption that the agreed entry price is below 92% of the MFN 
entry price. Nowadays, it is true in the vast majority of the cases in SMC Association Agreements, 
indicating again the a priori generous concessions made by the EU. In the two cases when the agreed 
entry price is greater than 92% of MFN entry price, the upper flat segment in the graph would disappear. 
 
Shipment price
EPMFN92%EPMFNEPP 92%EPp 
MTE-4%EPp 
MTE-8%EPp 
8%EPMFN 
4%EPMFN 
MTE 
96%EPp 96%EPMFN
t’MFN-t’P 
 12
The formula set out in (6) has been used to calculate the VPMEP for Moroccan 
clementines. This product is affected by the entry price under the following MFN 
treatment between November and February. 
 
Table 1. Entry price regime for MFN clementines  
Ad valorem tariff Entry and border prices Specific tariff 
border price>= entry price=64.9 €/100Kg 0 
64.9 €/100Kg > border price >= 63.6 €/100Kg 1.3 €/100Kg 
63.6 €/100Kg > border price >= 62.3€/100Kg 2.6 €/100Kg 
62.3 €/100Kg > border price >= 61 €/100Kg 3.9 €/100Kg 
61 €/100Kg > border price >= 59.7 €/100Kg  5.2 €/100Kg 
16% 
border price < 59.7 €/100Kg 10.6€/100Kg 
 Source: EC Regulation 1789/2003 
 
Morocco has agreed a lower entry price for 130,000 metric tonnes, and these are the 
conditions for the same period. Actual trade flows are clearly below this quota.5 
 
Table 2. Agreed entry price for Moroccan clementines 
Ad valorem tariff Entry and border prices Specific tariff 
border price>= entry price =48.4 €/100Kg 0 
48.4 €/100Kg >border price>= 47.4 €/100Kg 1 €/100Kg 
47.4€/100Kg >border price>= 46.5€/100Kg 1.9 €/100Kg 
46.5 €/100Kg >border price>= 45.5 €/100Kg 2.9 €/100Kg 
45.5 €/100Kg >border price>= 44.5 €/100Kg  3.9 €/100Kg 0% 
 border price < 44.5 €/100Kg 10.6€/100Kg 
 Source: EU-Morocco Association Agreement, review December 2003 (OJ L 345/119) 
 
We have calculated the monthly VPMEP from November 2005 to February 2006. The 
value of the monthly trade flows from Morocco has been extracted from COMEXT. 
                                                 
5 If the quota is binding, a new scenario appears where since the measure would have its own AVE. 
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Moroccan daily SIV have been collected from TARIC database, and their monthly 
averages have been calculated and used as proxies for the monthly border prices. As the 
VPM indicator assumes that rents are fully accrued by exporters, it is assumed that these 
border prices and SIV are the prices perceived by Moroccan exporters.  
 
The different tariffs to be applied in the calculations using (6) correspond to the ones to 
be paid with the calculated monthly prices under both MFN and Moroccan treatment. 
These data are summarized in table 3, and the results of the final calculations are shown 
in table 4. 
 
Table 3. Data on Moroccan clementines exports, Nov.05-Feb. 06 
 November December January February 
Quantity (100Kg) 117,713 373,839 228,622 79,749 
Average SIV (€/100Kg) 59.98 60.31 72.75 93.86 
 Source: COMEXT and own calculations based on TARIC database 
 
Table 4. Monthly VPMEP for Moroccan clementines 
 Specific gain 
(€) 
Ad valorem gain 
(€) 
Total gain =VPMEP 
(€) 
November 612,107.60 1,053,690.74 1,665,798.34 
December 1,943,962.80 3,096,492.82 5,040,455.62 
January 0 2,317,563.72 2,317,563.72 
February 0 971,391.72 971,391.72 
Total Nov.-Feb. 2,556,070.40 7,417,996.75 9,974,067.15 
 Source: own calculations based on TARIC database 
 
The overall results indicate that the transfer for Moroccan clementines is about 10 
million Euros, out of a total trade of 56 million Euros in the period. Preferences 
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represent therefore less than 18% of the value of trade, indicating their relative 
importance. The specific gain accounts for 2.5 million Euros of this transfer overall, the 
rest being due to the ad valorem gain. A monthly analysis shows that November and 
December behave quite differently than January and February.  
 
In November and December, Moroccan monthly SIV are below MFN entry price and 
hence Morocco obtains some specific gains. Overall, the specific gains for each month 
are between 36.7% and 38.7% of total transfer. But it may be worthwhile to stress the 
fact that this gain, even important, is not the maximum possible. In fact, Moroccan 
exports are not paying any specific tariff, but if they were cheaper –without 
undermining their preferential entry price- they would maximize the specific gain since 
they would fall on the upper flat segment in graph 2. 
 
For January and February, there is no specific gain since Moroccan shipments are more 
expensive than the MFN entry price level; thus, all the gain comes from the ad valorem 
tariff elimination and the entry price concession is useless in these months. 
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
 
It has been shown a new indicator for gauging the value of preferences in the case of 
entry price reduction. This indicator, the VPMEP, belongs to the group of indicators 
based on actual trade flows and stems from the VPM useful for calculating the potential 
transfer associated with tariff reductions. The main feature of this new indicator is that it 
allows decomposing the total transfer into the part associated with the reduction of entry 
price (e.g., reduction of specific tariff) and into the part associated with the above entry 
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price ad valorem tariff reduction -that always happens simultaneously to the 
aforementioned concession.  
 
In the empirical application, it has been shown that the value of preferences is almost 
18% of the value of Moroccan exports of clementines to the EU. It equals 10 million 
Euro, out of them 2.5 million correspond to the specific gain, and the rest stem from the 
ad valorem reduction. Hence, in spite of the a priori assumptions, it seems that the 
importance of the entry price reduction is secondary to the one of the ad valorem 
reduction. 
 
The use of the new indicator on a monthly basis allows identifying exporting and 
negotiating strategies for Morocco. In November and December, a reduction of export 
prices without undercutting the preferential entry price would allow the country to better 
exploit the concession and obtain higher preferential transfers. In January and February, 
the entry price reduction is useless and the country has two options. The first is trying to 
reduce export prices below the MFN entry price, so to have some specific gain. If the 
supply conditions make exporters reject this option, the second alternative for Morocco 
is to use this concession as a negotiating capital in future reviews of the agricultural 
protocol, with the possibility of giving up to the entry price reduction in favour of more 
profitable alternatives. 
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